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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Over fifty years ago, G. E. Moore pointed out that to say, 
 
(A) I went to the pictures last Tuesday but I don’t believe that I did 
(1942, p. 543) 
or 
 
(B) I believe that he has gone out. But he has not  
(1944, p. 204) 
 
would be “absurd” (1942, p. 543; 1944, p. 204). 
 Wittgenstein’s letters to Moore show that he was intensely interested 
in this discovery of a class of possibly true yet absurd assertions. 
Wittgenstein thought that the absurdity is important because it is “something 
similar to a contradiction, thought it isn’t one” (1974, p. 177). What is the 
explanation of the absurdity of saying or believing something about myself 
that might be true? Wittgenstein thought that although the explanation will 
say “something about the logic of assertion” it will also show that “logic 
isn’t as simple as logicians think it is”. So although the explanation should 
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appeal to a contradiction, the contradiction is not to be unearthed by logic 
when narrowly conceived as the study of syntactic relations between 
propositions. Rather it will be unearthed by the application of a broader 
conception of logic to the act of assertion. 
 What is Wittgenstein‘s explanation of the absurdity? The popular 
answer among his followers (Linville and Ring 1991, Goldstein 1993 and 
recently Heal 1994) is that avowals of belief just are (or entail) assertions. I 
argue that if Wittgenstein held this “avowal-as-assertion” account then this 
is bad news for Wittgensteinians. The account faces serious difficulties, 
notably that it cannot explain the absurdity of assertions typified by (A). A 
similar failure afflicts the “performative” account of Moorean belief (that 
normally, one can’t believe that one has beliefs without having them) which 
Heal attributes to Wittgenstein. 
 A satisfactory alternative account of Moorean assertion is that genuine 
assertions (and avowals of belief) entail expressions of belief. I recently 
sketched this account elsewhere (Williams 1994, 1996). Wittgenstein can 
plausibly be seen as anticipating this position in Remarks on the Philosophy 
of Psychology. A two-fold extension of this alternative account correlates 
with developments in his later philosophy. Cohering with this is an 
alternative account of Moorean belief. This is that Moorean propositions, if 
true, cannot be believed or cannot be believed without holding contradictory 
beliefs. This half of the account is consistent with Wittgenstein’s transition 
from the early to the later philosophy. 
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2. CONDITIONS OF ANY ACCOUNT OF MOOREAN ABSURDITY 
 
What conditions must be met by a successful account if Moorean absurdity? 
The first, to be defended shortly in §4, is that the account must identify a 
contradiction but without identifying it with the Moorean proposition itself. 
When confronted with Moorean utterances most people express a belief that 
a contradiction is involved. But aren’t Moore’s propositions possibly true? 
Since I am not omniscient, an (A)-type sentence might name a truth that I 
fail to believe. Since I am fallible, a (B)-type sentence might name a 
falsehood that I do believe.  
  Heal recognizes that a satisfactory solution “must be of adequate 
generality to explain the oddness of both thought and assertion” (1994, p. 6, 
my italics). But not just any thought. As Wittgenstein points out (1974, p. 
177 and 1980b §280), there is no absurdity in supposing (or at the level of 
speech, verbally conjecturing) that Moore’s propositions are true. Indeed 
Wittgenstein repeatedly stresses the paradoxical nature of this difference 
between assertion and supposition (1953, p. 190, 1980a, §§478 and 490). So 
thoughts of Moore’s propositions are not absurd unless they constitute 
thinking that the propositions are true. Then the absurdity remains even if 
the proposition is not asserted. So, the absurdity of these beliefs needs to be 
explained as well. Ideally, this condition should cohere with the first. 
Explaining the connection between the occurrence of the contradiction-like 
phenomenon in assertion and its occurrence in belief would provide the fit 
between the two sorts of explanations.  
 But a third condition is equally important. Moore’s examples typify 
two different forms of Moorean proposition (Williams 1979). Moore himself 
probably failed to see the difference. His account of one form fails to explain 
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the other. This fault is shared by many early explanations of the absurdity 
(Williams 1982b). 
 The difference hides under two layers of disguise in Moore’s 
examples. The obvious initial representation of (B)1 is 
 
 (b')  I believe that p but not-p. 
 
Linville and Ring stop here (1991, p. 295). Heal (1994, p. 6) and Gombay 
(1988, p. 192) go a step further. They achieve canonical reference to belief 
by commutation of (A), yielding 
 
(a)    I don’t believe that p but p. 
 
But a second layer of disguise remains. As Heal points out (1994, p. 7), my 
response, “I don’t think so” is often intended to be taken non-literally as, “I 
think not”. On the other hand, “where ‘I do not believe that p’ is taken as a 
self-ascription of ignorance as to whether p, then we do have a genuinely 
different structure” (1994, p. 7). This structural difference becomes visible if 
we now maximize the canonical form of Moore’s examples by making the 
second conjunct of (b') identical to that of (a), yielding 
 
(b) I believe that not-p but p. 
 
The structural difference between Moore’s propositions is now conspicuous 
as the difference between the internal and external negation of the belief-
operator. This apparently slight difference turns out to be crucial.  
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 The authenticity of the difference can be demonstrated. If believing 
that not-p entailed a lack of believe that p then contradictory beliefs would 
be impossible (unwelcome for reasons given in Williams 1982a and 
Sorensen 1988, p. 27). For if I believe that p and believe that not-p then (by 
applying the disputed principle to my second belief) I believe and don’t 
believe that p. And the converse entailment prohibits agnosticism. Since if I 
neither believe that p nor believe that not-p then (by applying it to my first 
belief) I believe and don’t believe that not-p. 
 So Heal is right to acknowledge (1994, p. 6) that “there are really two 
paradoxes”. As Gombay observes (1988, pp. 191-192), we can’t give them 
the same label (whether Wittgenstein’s label, “Moore’s paradox” (1968 p. 
190) or Linville and Ring’s label, “MS” (1991, p. 295)) and then discuss the 
labeled phenomena (as Linville and Ring do) as if there were no difference. 
Admittedly, Heal does not explicitly claim that a satisfactory explanation of 
the one paradox must satisfactorily explain the other as well. But she does 
expose (1994, p. 7) a serious weakness in the suggestion that an avowal of 
belief that p presents itself as conclusive evidence that p. This suggestion 
explains the absurdity of asserting (b) but fails for (a). And she observes 
(1994, p. 11) that Baldwin’s account of Moorean belief (that I cannot 
consciously believe (a) or (b) if I’m rational) suffers from the reverse lop-
sidedness. It explains the absurdity of believing (a) but fails for (b). These 
criticisms commit her to the third condition that any satisfactory explanation 
of Moorean assertion or belief must account for (a) and (b). Her own 
account however (1994, §§IV-VI) deals only with (b). 
 More importantly, the third condition is a methodological virtue. 
Given that rival explanations are on a par in other respects, the more general 
the explanation the better. But a single explanation of the four phenomena of 
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(a)-type assertion, (a)-type belief, (b)-type assertion and (b)-type belief, may 
be too much to hope for. An explanation of Moorean assertion may be 
unable to provide the explanation of Moorean belief. Indeed Moorean belief 
seems more absurd than Moorean assertion. The next best choice is therefore 
some pair of explanations which ideally should cohere together. 
 A fourth condition is suggested by Wittgenstein’s observation (1980b, 
§290) that “under unusual circumstances [the] sentence [ ‘It’s raining but I 
don’t believe it’] could be given a clear sense”. Note here that what ceases to 
be absurd is the use or utterance of a sentence rather than an assertion. In 
(1980a, §§485-487) Wittgenstein gives two consecutive examples of non-
absurd uses of (a)-type sentences followed by an example of a non-absurd 
use of a (b)-type sentence. An ideal account of Moorean absurdity must 
explain why these unusual circumstances remove the contradiction-like 
phenomenon that is usually present. 
 So in summary, any satisfactory account of Moorean absurdity must 
(i) identify a contradiction, or something contradiction-like, 
but not with the Moorean proposition itself 
(ii) make this identification for assertion and belief 
(iii) be equally plausible for (a) and (b) 
and  
(iv) explain the role of circumstances in which absurdity 
disappears. 
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3. THE AVOWAL-AS-ASSERTION ACCOUNT 
 
Wittgenstein credits Moore for having “said something about the logic of 
assertion” (1974, p. 177). What is it about asserting, as opposed to 
supposing or hypothesizing (a) or (b), that creates the absurdity? In 
(1980a, §478) Wittgenstein says: 
 
Moore’s paradox may be expresses like this: “I believe p” says roughly the same 
as “+ p”; but “Suppose I believe that p…” does not say roughly the same as 
“Suppose p”. 
 
Linville and Ring read this as the strong claim that an avowal of belief 
that p, “is a form of the assertion that p” (1991, p. 296), namely 
 
(1b')  My assertion that I believe that p just is an assertion that 
p. 
 
The absurdity of asserting any proposition of the form of (b) can now be 
explained (Linville and Ring 1991, p. 296) as follows. If I assert that (I 
believe that not-p but p) then I assert that I believe that not-p, which is, by 
(1b'), just to say that I assert that not-p. But since I assert (b) I assert that p. 
So on (1b') the assertion of (b) “consists of two contradictory assertions” 
(Linville and Ring 1991, p. 296, my italics). 
A weaker version of the avowal-as-assertion account avoids 
commitment to (1b') but accepts its entailment, namely 
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 (1b) If I assert that I believe that p then I assert that p. 
 
Heal seems to adopt this weaker position. In contrast with Linville and Ring, 
she does not explicitly identify the contradiction with the Moorean assertion 
itself but more cautiously claims that “p but not p” is what “[i]n effect has 
been said” (1994, pp.20-21, my italics). So on (1b) the assertion of (b) need 
not consist of two contradictory assertions but must at least entail them. 
 
4. A DEFENCE OF THE FIRST CONDITION 
 
Condition (i) prohibits identifying the contradiction with Moore’s 
propositions themselves. This prohibition is inconsistent with the strong 
avowal-as-assertion account. Because Linville and Ring accept (1b') they 
must hold that my assertion of (b) is a self-contradiction and so cannot be 
true (1991, pp. 295-96). To insist that (b) is not self-contradictory because it 
might be true therefore begs the question. But there is good evidence that 
Wittgenstein endorses condition (i) and that therefore the strong avowal-as-
assertion account cannot be consistently ascribed to him. Wittgenstein says 
that the absurdity is “something similar to a contradiction, though it isn’t 
one” (1974, p. 177, my italics). 
 Linville and Ring attempt to rebut Wittgenstein’s point that I can 
suppose that (a) or (b) are true without supposing a self-contradiction by 
dismissing appeals to imagination as tests of logical possibility (1991, p. 
299). But although the dismissal is correct, it misses the point. The appeal to 
supposition is not an appeal to mental picturing, but merely to the fact that to 
assert or believe a subjunctive counterfactual condition such as 
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 If I were to believe falsely that it’s raining then I would 
 be surprised to discover that the streets are wet 
 
is in no way absurd. And as Sorensen points out, my belief that 
 
 If I eat this mushroom and it is, contrary to my belief, 
 poisonous, then I will die 
 
has the practical consequence that I am unlikely to eat the mushroom unless 
I have great confidence in my belief that it is not poisonous. But conditionals 
with self-contradictory antecedents could have no such practical interest. 
And as Sorensen adds, the negations of Moore’s propositions are not 
tautologies (1988, p. 15). 
 
5. DIFFICULTIES IN THE ACCOUNT 
 
One point to note is that the account requires an additional conjunction 
principle for assertion, namely: 
 
 (ConjAss) If I assert that (p and q) then I assert that p and I assert that q. 
 
Since this principle is highly plausible we must now look to (1b') and (1b) in 
search of any flaw. 
 First consider the stronger version. One reason against it has been 
given already. The possible truth of Moore’s propositions is inconsistent 
with (1b'). Now inspect (1b') alone. To turn it around, must my assertion that 
p be an avowal of belief that p? Suppose that you arrest me on suspicion of 
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perpetrating Friday’s robbery. Wanting to divert the blame to my accomplice 
I look you straight in the eye and say, “Charlie did it, I tell you”. But Charlie 
and I have had a busy week and I have confused Friday’s robbery, which 
really was perpetrated by Charlie, with Thursday’s, which was perpetrated 
by myself. You are sufficiently experienced in deception to know that I am 
lying but you also have Charlie’s fingerprints, so you know that I am 
insincerely telling the truth. The strong intuition is that you should judge that 
what I have said is true. Now suppose that the situation is exactly the same, 
except that now I say instead, “I think Charlie did it”. Shouldn’t you judge 
that I have said something false? Intuitions may now be ambiguous, which 
itself casts doubt upon (1b').  
 Linville and Ring are committed to judging my avowal in this second 
case to be true, in order to protect (1b'). This is why they endorse (1991, p. 
305) Lakoff’s claim that “in statements it is the propositional content, not the 
entire sentence, that will be true or false” (1975, p. 257). But now suppose 
that I bend under interrogation and make the false confession, “I did it”. 
Shouldn’t we judge this false, but judge the avowal “I think Charlie did it” 
(said as my memory clears) to be true? If (as I argue §7) the truth-condit ions 
of avowals of belief that p are the sincerity-conditions of assertions that p, 
this is the answer we should give. Lakoff’s general claim seems much less 
plausible for avowals of hope, suspicion and fear. Suppose I say “I hope you 
will get the promotion”. You know that I am lying, because you know that I 
have just made an unsuccessful attempt to stop you getting it. Shouldn’t you 
judge me to have said something false? 
 I now turn to (1b). For on either version of the avowal-as-assertion 
account, (1b) is  what delivers the contradiction-like phenomenon. So if (1b) 
is false or fails to deliver the goods then the account fails. 
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 There is an apparent counterexample to (1b). You ask me whether the 
post office is open and I make the reluctant reply,  
 
 “I wouldn’t like to say (don’t quote me), but I think so”. 
 
Here I make an avowal of a belief that p which is qualified by a statement of 
reluctance to go as far as claiming that p. This statement serves as a 
disclaimer of responsibility. If you now waste a trip to the post office only to 
find it shut, you cannot reasonably blame me for having a false assertion, 
especially since I went to the trouble of clearly stating my reluctance to 
make one. Such disclaimers seem to prevent the avowal from being 
assertions of what is avowedly believed. If so then (1b) is false. 
 There is no absurdity in the reluctant reply. But if (1b) were true then 
it would be a way of remarking 
 
 “I wouldn’t like to say (don’t quote me), but it’s open”. 
 
Arguably this exhibits a performative absurdity. Here I tell you that I am not 
about to make an assertion. But this is then contradicted by my making one. 
Three defences of the avowal-as-assertion account seem to surface in 
discussions of the counterexample. 
 The first claims that with the right intonation my statement, “… but I 
think that it’s open” should be taken as an assertion that I believe that it is 
more (perhaps only just more) likely than not that it’s open. So I cannot be 
blamed if the post office is shut because I did not make the false assertion 
that it was open, but only the (possibly true) assertion that it was likely to be 
so. So my reluctant reply should really be taken as  
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“I wouldn’t like to say that it’s open (don’t quote me), but it’s likely 
to be so” 
 
which is not absurd. 
 But this commits us to saying that with the same intonation Moorean 
assertions must be taken as, “I don’t believe it’s likely, yet it’s true” and “I 
believe it unlikely yet it’s true”. Arguably the absurdity which we were 
supposed to explain has disappeared. Is it absurd to report that an outsider 
has won a horse race against the accepted odds? And if there is a pragmatic 
absurdity is it still of the original Moorean variety? 
  A second defence is to insist that I did make an assertion, albeit a 
self-confessedly reluctant one. My confession of reluctance disclaims 
responsibility for the consequences of my assertion (as avowal) that the post 
office is open. This is precisely why I cannot be blamed if the assertion turns 
out to be false. The price of this defence is that it entails rejecting an 
attractive view that Wittgenstein appears to adopt. In the later philosophy 
Wittgenstein frequently uses the verb “behaupten” for “assert”, one which 
he uses only twice (4.21, 6.2322) in the Tractatus. This term can be 
translated as “declaration of certainty”. On this view, my assertions are a bit 
like promises (cf. Linville and Ring 1991, p. 303) insofar as I give you some 
kind of guarantee that you can rely on them. This guarantee is explicitly 
annulled in the reluctant reply by my disclaimer of responsibility. So, on 
Wittgenstein’s view I could not have made an assertion. 
 One attraction of this view is that it is consistent with the intuition that 
claims to know, assertions, convictions, beliefs and avowals of belie lie on a 
diminishing scale of commitment to the truth. Thus to adapt Wittgenstein’s 
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example (1980b, §420), if A says “I believe it’s raining” and B says “I 
believe it’s not” the intuition that each contradicts the other is less 
substantial than if they had made flat contradictory assertions about rain. But 
(1b) renders this difference inexplicable.  
 The third defence of (1b) is to concede that it fails in exceptional 
counterexamples like the reluctant reply because it is normally, but not 
necessarily, true. Heal appears to make this concession in saying that “ a 
person learning the language is… trained to say ‘I believe that p’ sometimes 
as a substitute for the plain assertion ‘p’” (1994, p. 20, my italics). This non-
universality of (1b) is consistent with Wittgenstein’s claim that the meanings 
of “I believe that p” and “p” are roughly similar but not identical. But now 
suppose that I add “but it’s not” to my reluctant reply thus expanding it to 
 
“I wouldn’t like to say (don’t quote me), but I think that it’s open, but 
it’s not”. 
 
Moorean absurdity has not appeared. But if (1b) is falsified by the reluctant 
reply then it cannot be the explanation of the absurdity. Against this it might 
be claimed that the absurdity here is not Moorean. This would be consistent 
with the defence’s commitment to holding that the disappearance of 
Moorean absurdity coincides with the falsehood of (1b). The expanded reply 
is a conjunction of three elements. These are a statement of reluctance to 
assert that p, an avowal of belief that p and an assertion that non-p. If the 
absurdity of the expanded reply is not Moorean then there must be some 
pairing of these three elements which is absurd in a way different from the 
(b)-type Moorean absurdity of pairing its last two. The original reluctant 
reply, which conjoins the statement of reluctance with the avowal, is not 
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absurd. So the supposed non-Moorean absurdity must lie in the conjunction 
of the statement of reluctance with the assertion that non-p, namely 
 
“I wouldn’t like to say (don’t quote me) but it’s not open”. 
 
But consistently with the reluctant reply this can be plausibly taken as 
 
“I’m not going to say (I don’t want to say) that the post office is open, 
it’s not” 
 
which is not absurd either. 
 
6. THE FAILURE OF THE ACCOUNT 
 
If these difficulties can be resolved then the absurdity of asserting (b) is 
satisfactorily explained by the avowal-as-assertion account as contradictory 
assertions which are entailed by the assertion of (b), although (b) is not itself 
a contradiction. So far so good. But how is the absurdity of a (a)-type 
assertions to be explained? 
 Obviously, (1b), which is a principle about asserting a belief, cannot 
explain the absurdity of asserting (a), which is not an assertion of believe, 
but rather an assertion of lack of belief. Goldstein recently (1993, pp. 94-95) 
attempts to remedy this by extending (1b) to  
 
(G) If I assert that I don’t believe that p then I deny that p or express 
my refusal to accept that p. 
 
 15 
Since denying that p is just asserting that not-p, this is ambiguous between 
 
 (1a)  If I assert that I don’t believe that p then I assert that not-p 
 
and 
(G') If I assert that I don’t believe that p then I express my refusal to 
accept that p. 
 
Forget (G') for the moment. (1a) explains the absurdity of (a)-type assertion 
thus. If I assert that (I don’t believe that p but p), then by (ConjAss) I assert 
that I don’t believe that p, and so, by (1a), I assert that not-p. But by (ConjAss) 
again, I assert that p. 
 But now the account demonstrably fails. If (1a) were true then an 
agnostic who asserted, “I neither believe that God exists nor believe that He 
doesn’t” would be both asserting and denying the existence of God. Clearly 
he isn’t so (1a) is false. As a principle about self-ascription of ignorance, (1a) 
is entirely implausible. My admission of ignorance of your innocence is not 
an accusation of guilt. Moreover, as Wittgenstein points out (1980b, §420), 
if A says “I believe it’s raining” and B says “I don’t believe so”, they are not 
contradicting each other. Wittgenstein’s point is especially salient if B’s 
remark is a self-ascription of ignorance. But A and B would contradict each 
other if both (1b) and (1a) were true. 
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7. AN ALTERNATIVE WITTGENSTEINIAN ACCOUNT OF 
MOOREAN ASSERTION 
 
Wittgenstein’s clearest commitment to (1b) is in (1980a, §490): 
 
The paradox is this: the supposition may be expressed as follows: “Suppose this went 
on inside me and that outside” – but the assertion [Behauptung] that this is going on 
inside me asserts [behauptet] this is going on outside me. As suppositions the two 
propositions about the inside and the outside are quite independent, but not as 
assertions. 
 
The central idea here is that of independence between what I say about the 
inside (my beliefs) and what I say about the outside (the outside world). The 
formulation of the dependence is crucial in explaining Moorean absurdity. 
So Heal is quite right to point out that a serious defect of functionalism is 
that it makes belief into an inner state which is non-casually “independent of 
how things are outside” (1994, p. 18). Once the independence is severed 
there can be no case in which (a) or (b) are absurdly asserted. 
Wittgenstein can be read as endorsing two such dependencies which 
in turn satisfactorily explain Moorean assertion. An integral part of both 
dependencies is the idea of sincerity, or believing what one says. In (1980a, 
§472) Wittgenstein says: 
 
I want to say first of all with the assertion “it’s going to rain” one expresses 
[drückt aus] belief in that just as one expresses the wish to have wine with the 
words “Wine over here!” One might also put it like this: “I believe p” means 
roughly the same as “p”. 2 
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So the inside depends upon the outside in that: 
 
(2) If I assert that p then I express a belief that p. 
 
In other words, my avowal of belief that p is an Äusserung not in the sense 
of a statement or assertion (Behauptung) that p but in the sense of an 
expression or voicing of the belief (einen Glauben ausdrücken). How is the 
belief expressed? In (1953, p. 190), Wittgenstein explains the rough equation 
of meaning between “I believe that p” and “p” as the fact that they are used 
in similar ways. In other words, as Heal point out (1994, p. 20), a person is 
taught to make avowals of belief that p in the same way that he is taught to 
make assertions that p. So unless I’m self-deceived, I don’t need to look to 
my behaviour (see Wittgenstein 1980a, §501) nor inside myself to Cartesian 
or Tractarian mental objects (see Wittgenstein 1980a §488) in order to make 
a sincere avowal of belief that p. All I need to do is to look at the world and 
ask myself whether p. In (1980a, §477) Wittgenstein in turn identifies the 
rough equation of meaning or use with the fact that “We react in roughly the 
same way when anyone says the first and when he says the second”. How 
we react depends on what we are looking for. A priest looking for converts 
reacts to a presumedly sincere assertion of the existence of God in the same 
way as he would react to a presumedly true avowal of belief in God. The 
existence of God is an issue which the priest regards as settled. What he 
hopes to discover is the belief. By contrast, your reaction to a presumedly 
true avowal of belief that the trains are still running might be different from 
your reaction to a presumedly true assertion that they are. What interest you 
are not my beliefs but catching the train. But sincerity is a far less reliable 
indicator of truth-telling than truth-telling is of sincerity. 
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 But whether we are looking for the belief or the truth, we would not 
react in the same way if we knew that the avowal of belief was made truly 
(or falsely) on one occasion but that the assertion that p was made 
insincerely (or sincerely) on another. The priest would react differently. And 
if we are interested in whether the trains are running then knowing that the 
speaker is insincere should make a difference to our confidence that they are 
running.  
 The connection of meaning then between “I believe that p” and “p” is 
that my practice of truly using the first is normally the same as my practice 
of sincerely using the second. There can be abnormal cases in which I 
insincerely (untruthfully) tell the truth. For example, I might pretend to let 
you know something which in fact is just a lucky guess. Or my attempt to 
deceive you with a lie may be defeated by the fact that my belief in the 
falsehood of my assertion is mistaken. But unless you recognize such rare 
cases for what they are, your justification for thinking me a truth-teller 
includes the justification for thinking me sincere. 
 So in asserting that p, I normally express a belief that p in the sense 
that I afford you the prima facie justification for thinking me sincere, by 
affording you the prima facie justification for thinking me a truth-teller. 
 What justifies this ascription of truth? Perhaps not Moore’s claim 
(1942, pp. 542-543) that lying is vastly exceptional, nor my strengthened 
version of it (Williams 1994, p. 164) that insincerity is necessarily 
exceptional. Both claims invite challenge by skeptical brains-in-vats or evil 
demon scenarios3. Nonetheless, the rational thing to do is to take 
appearances at face-value, unless keen observation indicates otherwise. So 
what entitles you to take me as a truth-teller and as sincere is the 
experimentally undefeated presumption that falsehood and insincerity are 
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exceptional. When asking for directions in a strange town, it is better bet to 
err on the side of gullibility than paranoia, even if (for once) the paranoid 
prejudice is correct and all the natives are out to get you. 
 The absurdity of asserting either of Moore’s propositions can now be 
explained: If I assert either then by (ConjAss) I asset that p. So by (2) I 
express a belief that p. But by (ConjAss) again, I assert a lack of belief that p 
in (a) or I assert a belief that not-p in (b). So what I conjointly assert and 
express is a contradiction in (a) and contradictory beliefs in (b). As one 
might expect, the different conceptual structures of (a) and (b) result in a 
difference in the contradiction-like phenomena. 
 The only plausible reading of (G') is one which collapses into (2). (G')  
explains the absurdity of asserting (a) as follows. If I assert that (I don’t 
believe that p but p) then I assert that I don’t believe that p. So by (G') I 
express my refusal to accept that p. Goldstein comments that such a speaker 
“is, or purports to be, simultaneously putting a proposition forwards and 
taking it back” (1993, p. 95). But how is the metaphor of putting and taking 
to be read? Surely “accept” is used here as a synonym of “believe”. So in 
asserting a proposition, I put it forward in the sense that I purport to believe 
it. On reading or “purport” is “pretend”. But while this fits lies, it doesn’t fit 
other types of assertion. A liar pretends to believe or know his assertion in 
order to establish the authority needed to make his dupe believe it too. But if 
I sincerely let you know something then I don’t pretend to believe it because 
I do believe it. The only plausible reading of “purport” is the non-factive 
sense of “express”, which yields (2). 
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8. THE FIRST EXTENSION OF THE ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT 
 
The alternative account locates the contradiction-like phenomena on a 
hybrid level of assertion-plus-expression. But wouldn’t it be better to locate 
it on a single-level? The answer to this is that the account can be extended to 
locate the contradiction-like phenomenon purely at the level of expression of 
belief as well. This extended account is again a consequence of the key idea 
that your justification for thinking me a truth-teller includes the justification 
for thinking me sincere.  
 Wittgenstein’s view of the outside is that the dependence is two-way. 
The outside depends upon the inside as well. As Wittgenstein remarks in 
(1953, p. 191) my assertion “It is so”, “throws light” on my state of mind in 
the same way as, “I believe it is so”. So if you are justified in thinking that I 
tell the truth when I avow a belief that p then you are justified in thinking 
that I really do believe that p. This does not commit you to thinking that I 
have asserted that p but only to thinking that any assertion I might make 
would be sincere. This can be formulated as 
 
(3b) If I assert that I believe that p then I express a belief that p.  
 
Similarly, if you are justified in thinking that I tell the truth when I avow a 
lack of belief that p then you are justified in thinking that I really don’t 
believe that p. This can be formulated as 
 
(3a) If I assert that I don’t believe that p then I express a lack of 
believe that p. 
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In (1974, p. 177) Wittgenstein comments: 
 
If someone asks me “Is there a fire in the next room?” and he answers “I believe 
there is” I can’t say: “Don’t be irrelevant. I asked you about the fire, not about 
your state of mind!” 
 
The avowal of belief is relevant because in making it, I say something about 
my inner self (in the double sense of avowing and therefore expressing my 
belief) and say something about the outside world in the sense that I say that 
I have a view of how the world is (as including a fire in the next room) 
although I might not be prepared to claim that this is how it is. 
 This shows that Linville and Ring’s argument for the avowal-as-
assertion account is unsound. In effect the argument is this: an avowal of 
belief is either about the avower or is about the outside world and since it is 
not about the avower it is therefore an assertion about the outside world 
(1991, p. 296). Because the avowal is about both, the second premise is false. 
 Goldstein’s (G') commits him to (3a) as well as (2). (G') says that in 
asserting that I don’t believe that p. I express my refusal to accept (believe) 
that p in the sense that I purport to take it back. For the same reasons given 
in the last section, purporting to not believe it can only be plausibly taken as 
expressing the lack of belief in it. 
 The absurdity of asserting either of Moore’s propositions can now be 
explained as follows. If I assert either then by (ConjAss) I assert that p and so 
by (2) I express a belief that p. But by (ConjAss) again, I assert that I don’t 
believe that p in (a) or I assert that I believe that not-p in (b). So by (3a) I 
express a lack of belief that p or by (3b) I express a belief that not-p. The 
absurdities are thus explained yet distinguished as expressing a contradiction 
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in (a) as opposed to expressing contradictory beliefs in (b). The connection 
between Moorean belief is also simply explained as the fact that a Moorean 
assertor expresses Moorean beliefs. 
 
 
9. THE SECOND EXTENSION OF THE ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT 
 
In §7 we saw that by making an assertion I afford a hearer the prima facie 
justification to think that I am telling the truth  and the prima facie 
justification to think that I am sincere. Combining these two justifications 
constitutes the justification to believe me. Both justifications are needed. If 
you know that I am sincere but mistaken in what I assert then you won’t 
believe me. And if you know that I’m making a lucky guess, inadvertently 
telling the truth in failed attempt to deceive you or merely parroting 
information again you won’t believe me, although you will believe what I 
say. To believe me is to believe that I am sincerely (truthfully) telling the 
truth. So when I assert something, I give you prima facie justification to 
believe me. If the assertion is Moorean then the justification is worthless 
because in fact it is a justification for not believing me in the case of (a) or 
for not believing me on the charitable assumption that I am minimally 
rational in the case of (b).  
 To see this, suppose that you do believe me. Since you think me 
sincere in asserting the second conjunct, you believe that I believe that p. 
And since you believe what I say in the first conjunct, you believe that I 
don’t believe that p in (a) and you believe that I believe that not-p in (b). If 
you are to believe me, you must have contradictory beliefs in the first case 
(conclusive grounds for disbelieving me, which will therefore force any 
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rational person to withhold belief) and you must think I have them in the 
second (conclusive grounds for believing me irrational). So you cannot 
believe me unless you are irrational or judge me to be so. 
 The spirit of this account is arguably late-Wittgensteinian, in being a 
treatment of the whole person rather than just of relations between 
propositions. The treatment clarifies what goes right in communication by 
diagnosing what goes wrong. Central to the diagnosis is the idea of 
expression which is in turn located in a social context. Cohering with this is 
the provision of a psychological explanation of our puzzlement when 
confronted with real-life Moorean speakers. When I say (a) or (b), I express 
doxastic contradiction in me or you. Detecting this, you look inside yourself 
and fail to find it there and by the charitable principle of avoiding ascriptions 
of irrationality (see Sorenson 1988, p. 132) you hesitate to locate it in me. So 
you look at what I’ve asserted, but you can’t detect the contradiction there 
either.  
 
 
10. THE “PERFORMATIVE” ACCOUNT OF MOOREAN BELIEF 
 
As might be expected from her treatment of Moorean assertion, Heal 
concentrates exclusively on (b). Avowals of belief don’t constitute believing 
in the way that marriage vows normally constitute marrying. Nonetheless 
Heal insists that second-order beliefs have “a sort of performative character” 
(2994, p. 21) in that “when I come to thought that I believe that p then I do, 
in virtue of that very thought, believe that p” (1994, p. 22), i.e.: 
 
(4b) If I believe that I believe that p then I believe that p. 
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The absurdity of believing any proposition of the form of (b) can now be 
explained as follows. If I believe that (I believe that not-p but p) then I 
believe that not-p. So by (4b) I believe that not-p. But since I believe (b), I 
believe that p. 
 
11. THE FAILURE OF THE PERFORMATIVE ACCOUNTS 
 
Just as the avowal-as-assertion account requires the principle that assertion 
distributes over conjunction, so the performative account requires its parallel 
for belief: 
 
(ConjBel)  If I believe that (p and q) then I believe that p and I 
believe that q. 
 
Again this seems undeniable. But the absurdity of believing (a), which is 
about a lack of belief, cannot be explained by Heal’s (4b). If I believe that (I 
don’t believe that p but p) then by (ConjBel) I believe that I don’t believe that 
p but I do believe that p. But (4b) cannot yield contradictory beliefs from 
this. We could try maximizing coherence with the original explanation by 
appealing to the analogue of (4b): 
 
(4a) If I believe that I don’t believe that p then I don’t believe 
that p. 
 
But now the possibility of absurd (a)-type beliefs refuses this parallel 
principle. If I believe that (I don’t believe that p but p) then by (ConjBel) I 
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believe that I don’t believe that p and I believe that p. But by (4a) I don’t 
believe that p. 
 Flat contradiction is likewise entailed by applying both (4b) and (4a) 
to a more sophisticated form of (b), in which “I believe that q” is substituted 
for “p”, yielding 
 
 (b*) I believe that I don’t believe that q but I believe that q. 
 
If I believe (b*) then by (ConjBel), I believe that I believe that I don’t believe 
that q and I believe that q. Applying (4b) to strip off the first layer of belief-
operators entails that I believe that I don’t believe that q and I believe that q. 
But applying (4a) to this first belief entails that I don’t believe that q. 
 We must therefore either deny the possibility of believing (a) or (b*) 
or reject one of the two principles which entail the flat contradiction. On the 
first option the explanation is not that Moorean belief entails contradictory 
beliefs but rather Hintikka’s claim (1962, p. 67) that Moorean belief is 
impossible. But the performative account explains the absurdity of (b)-type 
beliefs once held in terms of contradictory beliefs (which are possible). So 
since (ConjBel) is unassailable, (4a) is false whenever it is absurd to believe 
(a) and either (4a) or (4b) is false whenever it is absurd to believe (b*). 
 Admittedly, Heal could reject (4a) but retain (4b) without formal 
contradiction. They are logically independent. But they do seem to stand or 
fall together, depending upon the corrigibility of judgments about my own 
mental states. If my conviction that I believe that God does not exist is 
performative then why isn’t my conviction that I don’t believe that God 
exists? 
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 One temptation to accept (4b) might be an assimilation of “belief” 
with “thought”. I can’t think about a thought of eels without thinking about 
eels. But it doesn’t follow that I can’t have a belief about a belief without 
having that belief. For although believing is a kind of thinking, most of us 
have long believed that eels don’t eat glass without having thoughts of glass-
eating eels. 
 Heal recognizes that (4b) might be occasionally defeated by tiredness, 
stress or drugs (Heal 1994, p. 22). A further possible falsification of both 
principles is self-deception. My sincere professions or open-mindedness 
about the status of women or of lack of prejudice against them, may both be 
mistaken. In such exceptional cases my observation of my outward 
behaviour might help me to discover what my inner beliefs really are and so 
remove the self-deception. 
 But like Moorean assertion, Moorean belief is always absurd. 
Therefore the circumstances in which the performative principles are false 
are those in which the absurdity of Moorean belief persists. Hence the 
principles cannot be the explanation of the persistent absurdity. For example, 
assume that I’m convinced that I have a false belief in the equality of women, 
as a case of (b), or that I’m convinced that I lack the correct belief  that 
women are unequal, as a case of (a). Both convictions are certainly absurd. 
Now suppose that both are the product of self-deception so that both are 
mistaken and (4a) and (4b) are both false. Far from expunging the absurdity 
of my convictions, this supposition seems to heighten it. 
 To advert to Heal’s consideration, the fact that I have been deprived 
of sleep for a week, have been arrested for murder and am high on LSD, 
might be the cause of my absurd Moorean conviction (why I’m mad). But it 
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might also be the cause the failure of (4a) and (4b) in which case these 
principles won’t explain the nature of the absurdity (the madness) itself. 
 
 
12. AN ALTERNATIVE ACCOUNT OF MOOREAN BELIEF 
 
The account I propose appeals to the fact that Moore’s propositions are 
“blindspots”. Here I use Sorensen’s term but not for his reasons. Sorensen 
argues that (a) and (b) are belief-blindspots for me in that I cannot believe 
them. Here “cannot” is to be specified by background constraints which can 
range from 
 
Merely the rules of logic,… to a more substantial set of constraints such as the 
laws of physics, the principles of psychology, or immunity from structural 
criticisms (1988, pp. 52-53). 
 
Sorensen is methodologically committed to avoiding logics of belief (1988, 
pp. 19-22). This is why he restricts the use of doxastic principles to a 
hypothetical test of structural flaws in beliefs, the results of which are to be 
compares to their constraining desiderata (1988, p. 43). 
 My account of the blindspots is simpler. Take (a). If I believe that (I 
don’t believe that p but p) then by (ConjBel) I believe that p. But then (a) is 
false because its first conjunct is false. It is therefore a mistake to think that 
because the content of a belief could be true, it would be possible to 
“believe-it-correctly”. For (a) is a possible truth and I can believe it but it 
cannot be true if I believe it. By contrast, I can correctly believe (b). If I 
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believe that (I believe that not-p but p) then by (ConjBel) I believe that p. 
Nonetheless (b) might be true if I hold contradictory beliefs. 
 Alternatively put, my believing either (a) or (b) entails (by applying 
(ConjBel) to its second conjunct) that I believe that p. But the correctness of 
what I believe entails that I don’t believe that p in (a) or that I believe that 
not-p in (b). So my believing-correctly entails a contradiction in the case of 
(a) and contradictory beliefs in the case of (b). Yet (a) and (b) themselves 
might be true of me and might be believed by me. 
 This account of the blindspots is more economical than Sorensen’s. I 
have two constraints on the believability of Moore’s propositions. In the 
case of (a) it is truth, the weakest one of all. In the case of (b) it is minimal 
rationality or the absence of contradictory beliefs. This economy is enabled 
by my minimal commitment to (ConjBel) as opposed to a full-blown logic of 
belief, of which I am equally suspicious. I see no methodological objection 
to using a plausibly true principle which is about what it explains. 
 Conditions (i) and (ii) have now been met for belief, as they were for 
assertion, and so (ii) is met as well. We also have the desirable fit between 
the explanations of Moorean belief and of Moorean assertion. The 
contradiction-like phenomena entailed by Moorean correctly-believing is 
identical to that expressed by Moorean assertion or ascribed by those who 
believe Moorean assertors. 
 We can also explain why Moorean assertion seems less absurd then 
Moorean belief. Moorean assertors express Moorean beliefs which are 
conclusive signs of irrationality. But Moorean assertors can express 
Moorean beliefs which they don’t have. It is a lesser sin to licence the 
criticism of irrationality than to be guilty of it. 
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 Wittgenstein never explicitly mentions Moorean belief. What criteria 
should we adopt for ascribing an account of it to him? The charitable answer 
is that we should prefer those accounts which are maximally satisfactory and 
which maximally cohere with the rest of Wittgenstein’s thought. Obviously 
Heal appeals to the first criterion. And she appeals to the second in claiming 
that (4b) parallels Wiitgenstein’s views on first-person pain statements (1994, 
p. 20, fn.9). My own account of Moorean belief satisfies this second 
criterion at least as well because it coheres with Wittgenstein’s views in the 
Tractatus (1922, 5.63 ff.). 
 Just as (a) could not report a truth about an omniscient being so (b) 
could not report a truth about an infallible one. But for human beings, who 
cannot contemplate the world sub specie arterni, Moorean belief involves an 
interesting modal shift. Of course I can have non-Moorean beliefs that I am 
non-omniscient or fallible. These are beliefs that there is some substitution-
instance of “p” for which (a) or (b) are true for me. They are rational beliefs 
precisely because there very probably are and thus can be such instances of 
ignorance or error. But it (a) reports a specific instance of such ignorance 
then I cannot believe it correctly. Given my ignorance, I cannot believe 
correctly that this instance of ignorance occurs. Similarly, I am necessarily 
ignorant of my specific errors reported by (b)-type propositions if I am 
minimally rational. The reason that there are truths about my specific 
ignorance (or errors) which I cannot believe is that as an epistemological 
subject they cannot appear in my conception (or rational conception) of the 
world (cf. Baldwin, 1990, p. 231). Truth (or rationality) constrains us from 
seeing our own individual failures of vision. This account does not commit 
us to a view of the self as a metaphysical limit nor to solipsism, both of 
which might be seen as unwelcome Tractarian consequences. So 
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Wittgenstein might have consistently carried the account over into the later 
philosophy. 
 The account also provides the missing explanation of Gombay’s 
correct claim that Moore’s propositions report states which are 
“counterprivate” (1988, p. 193). Anyone except me can (sensibly) think or 
say that I am in these specific states. This is starkly opposed to the 
performative account which holds that my vision of my beliefs (unlike that 
of others) is normally perfect. But in fact I am blind to the relation of my 
specific beliefs to the world in a way that no-one else is. Given the anti-
private tenor of Wittgenstein’s later philosophy, the alternative account 
coheres with it better. 
 
 
13. THE DISAPPEARANCE OF ABSURDITY 
 
We can now explain the role of circumstances in which the absurdity of 
saying (a) or (b) disappears, thus meeting condition (iv).  
 Wittgenstein’s first example (1980a, §485) of the disappearance is my 
exclamation of amazement. “He’s coming but I still can’t believe it”. This is 
explained by Baldwin’s observation that we naturally interpret the second 
part of the remark as saying, “I find it very difficult to believe it” (1990, p. 
229). By the principle of charity, we seek ways of believing the speaker 
without making self-ascriptions of contradictory beliefs. By the same 
principle, we can believe that a tabloid reporter has genuine information 
which is “incredible” only by making this claim as presenting a fact which 
resists but merits belief. 
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 Wittgenstein’s second example is a railway announcer who is 
convinced (perhaps groundlessly) that the train won’t arrive. He announces 
its arrival and adds, “Personally I don’t believe it” (1980a, §§486-487). This 
corresponds to (a). The third example is a soldier who produces military 
communiqués but adds that he believes they are incorrect. This corresponds 
to (b). Both remarks seem absurd unless we suppose that the speaker is 
merely parroting the assertion of an authority. Then the absurdity vanishes 
along with our justification to think that the speaker believes what he utters. 
The parroting is not a genuine assertion but the report of one. 
 A similarly spurious assertion occurs if I mention someone else’s 
assertion in order to assert its negation. No absurdity arises if I sarcastically 
intone your claim that the earth is flat and add “I don’t think!”. Obviously I 
afford you no reason to think I believe the claim I’m denying. The absurdity 
of saying “it’s true but I don’t believe it” is similarly expunged by the 
recognition that the speaker is making a wild guess in a “true-or-false” quiz 
in which success is merely the right answer (as opposed to the demonstration 
of knowledge).  
 In each case, the absurdity is remover by removing the justification to 
think that the speaker believes what he says. If the exclamation, tabloid 
exaggeration, announcement, communiqué, denial or guess were genuine 
assertions then they would be absurd. But none of them are. 
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Notes 
                                                 
1 Heal actually uses a different example from either of Moore’s namely, “I believe that it is 
raining but it is not” (1994, p. 5) 
 
 
 
2 Wittgenstein’s view here startlingly resembles Searle’s “(1983, p.9): 
 
…in the performance of each illusionary act with a prepositional content, we express a certain 
International state with that prepositional content, and that Intentional state is the sincerity 
condition of tat type of speech act. 
 
Searle goes on to point out that one can express intentional states without being in them. 
 
 
3Roy Sorensen pointed this out to me. 
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